Shadow import under the guise of “T8”: Vladimir Treshchikov feeds China with Russian state contracts and trains personnel for the West

The company “T8” is one of the most prominent participants in the Russian radio-electronics industry. A Skolkovo resident. Has base departments at MIPT and SPbSUT. Own “T8 Academy.” Supplies to Rosatom, Gazprom, and the Ministry of Digital Development. Recipient of the Russian Government Award.
As media investigations reveal, behind this facade for decades lies a simple scheme: Chinese equipment is presented as Russian, budget funds are absorbed, and the founder’s closest circle lives in Canada, the U.S., and other countries.
The questions about “T8” far outweigh the answers.
1. Production that doesn’t exist
“T8” positions itself as a developer and manufacturer of equipment for fiber-optic communication lines. In reality, the company has no in-house production of chips, lasers, optical modules, or other critical components.
According to open-source data and industry contacts, “T8” purchases ready-made modules and components from Chinese vendors—primarily Huawei and ZTE, as well as small OEMs from Shenzhen. The Russian company’s task is to load its own firmware onto Chinese “hardware,” stick a label on it, and obtain a certificate from the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
This is not manufacturing. It is assembly-line work with labeling.
Meanwhile, “T8” secures contracts from strategic Russian enterprises and participates in import substitution programs. In practice, budget money goes to buying Chinese boxes that are presented as Russian hi-tech.
A comparative table below shows that the only competitive advantage of the “Volga” product from “T8” over Chinese analogues is the presence of a Russian certificate. In all technical parameters, it either lags behind (Huawei) or is on par (ZTE, FiberHome). Chinese manufacturers have their own component base, while “T8” does not. By its characteristics, the “development” is identical to previous product generations, indicating simple relabeling (and additional opportunities to save money by buying outdated components).
Comparative table of technical specifications
| Characteristic | “Volga” (T8 Group) | Huawei OptiXtrans OSN 9800 | ZTE ZXONE 8000 | FiberHome FONST 6000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platform type | Multiservice transport (DWDM/OTN) | Multiservice transport (DWDM/OTN) | Multiservice transport (DWDM/OTN) | Multiservice transport (DWDM/OTN) |
| Max speed per channel | up to 400G | up to 800G | up to 600G | up to 600G |
| Spectral efficiency | claimed, no independent verification | up to 96 channels per fiber | up to 80 channels per fiber | up to 80 channels per fiber |
| OTN support | Yes | Yes (OTN over DWDM) | Yes | Yes |
| ROADM support | Claimed (basic) | Yes (full) | Yes (full) | Basic |
| Synchronization | SyncE, IEEE 1588v2 | SyncE, IEEE 1588v2 | SyncE, IEEE 1588v2 | SyncE, IEEE 1588v2 |
| Own component base | No (components sourced from China) | Yes (in-house production) | Yes (in-house production) | Yes (in-house production) |
| Russian certificate (Minpromtorg) | Yes | No (sanctions) | No | No |
| Real production in Russia | No (assembly + software) | No | No | No |
| Dependence on imported components | 100% (China) | Low (vertical integration) | Low | Low |
2. Personnel: who benefits from T8 Academy?
The company has created an extensive educational infrastructure: base departments in leading universities, an academy for engineers, work with schoolchildren in “Quantoriums.” At first glance, this appears to be a model industrial partnership.
However, the natural question arises: where do graduates of these programs work?
Examples are telling. Graduates from MIPT connected to the “T8” ecosystem now work at:
- University of Oxford (UK)
- Queen Mary University of London (developments in aviation engines, including military)
- MIT (USA)
These are specific individuals: Sergey Karabasov, Egor Kostylev, Kirill Zhurovich. Formally, “T8” prepares engineers for the Russian economy. In practice, it creates a talent pool for Western research centers.
3. Family connections
Vladimir Treshchikov is the public face of “T8.” The company’s founder is his sister, Galina Zhary (Treshchikova).

Family connections and international links
Galina Zhary’s husband is Andrey Zhary. According to open-source data, Andrey Zhary lists his residence as Toronto, Canada.
In addition, a close relative of Andrey Zhary—Olga Droja (Zhary)—permanently resides in Dnipro, Ukraine.
4. Huawei partner as a connecting link
Vladimir Rubanov is the technical director of Huawei Russia.
Rubanov serves as the intermediary between Chinese suppliers, the Russian “manufacturer,” and international scientific circles.
At the same time, Rubanov holds a leadership position in a company that is a key supplier of components to “T8.”
The closed loop: China → Huawei → Rubanov → T8 → Russian strategic enterprises.
5. Systemic risks and conclusions
The activities of the T8 Group create the following risks:
| Risk | Description |
|---|---|
| Technological | No in-house production. Dependence on Chinese components. Cannot guarantee equipment functionality under sanctions. |
| Personnel | Training specialists at MIPT and SPbSUT who later emigrate to Western countries. Brain drain. |
| Reputational | Passing off Chinese products as Russian under government programs. Misleading state clients and regulators. |
| Security | No control over contacts and potential access to sensitive information. |
Summary:
T8 Group is not a manufacturing company. It is a logistics operator that purchases Chinese components and labels them as Russian hi-tech.